

FROM MONASTIC ETHICS TO MODERN SOCIETY¹

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Venerable Sheng-Yen, in the Prologue to *Buddhist Ethics and Modern Society*, says "The precepts (*Vinaya*) form the basis of Buddhist ethics." He goes on to say that "Buddhist lay members need obey only 5, or at the most 8, Buddhist novices must obey 10, while adult monks and nuns have to obey anywhere from 250 to more than 300."² Although Sheng-Yen is wrong in not distinguishing the basis of ethical conduct for the laity as separate from the monastic code of the *Vinaya*, a traditional association in East Asian Buddhism where the terms *śīla* and *Vinaya* are compounded, his mistake is rather commonly made even the Indian tradition where the terms are indeed separate and never compounded. Akira Hirakawa has offered considerable insight on the need to separate the traditional compound *śīla/vinaya* into its component parts for a proper understanding of each term,³ but it is rather ordinary and regular, I think, for scholars to associate *Vinaya* rather than *śīla* with ethics.

It is critical for our study to understand *why* the distinction between these terms is so important, and precisely *how* the distinction impacts on our original topic. The technical term *Vinaya*, derived from the Sanskrit prefix *vi* + *√nī*, is often rendered as (some variant of) training, education, discipline, or control. John Holt, utilizing another etymologically valid approach suggests, "*Vinaya*, the reified noun form of the verb *vi* + *√nī* therefore leads us to the general meaning of 'that which separates,' or 'that which removes.'"⁴ Holt goes on:

Our translation of the term *vinaya* begs the question: what is being removed? To answer that question in the simplest terms, that which is being removed are wrong states of mind, the conditions of grasping, desire and ignorance which stem from the delusion that we have a "self" that can be satiated. The discipline of the *Vinayapīṭaka* represents a systematic assault on the idea of "ego-consciousness."⁵

Charles Wei-hsun Fu, utilizing Hirakawa's etymological analysis which captures the essence of both meanings

cited above, comes to the same conclusion: "*Vinaya* referred to the established norms of the *Sangha* that all members were expected to observe to maintain the monastic order and insure its continuation."⁶ In other words, the *Vinaya* was as much concerned with the *pariśuddhi* or complete purity of the community, individually and *organizationally*, as it was with the specifics of ethical conduct.⁷ Under no circumstances should we presume that ethical concerns were superseded in the *Vinaya*, but rather were included in a *series of tiered concerns* that focused on institutional, but not *exclusively* ethical conduct.

Śīla, more difficult etymologically than *Vinaya*, is probably derived from the verb *śīl* and generally translated as virtue, moral conduct, morality, or some similar variant (although Buddhaghosa in the *Visuddhimagga* traces it to a different verb root, associated with "cooling" and Vasubandhu in the *Abhidharmakośa* suggests it derives from the verb *śī*, which he too associates with cooling).⁸ As such, it is a *highly ethical* term, almost exclusively applied to the *individual*, and referenced to his or her self-discipline. Additionally, one finds such references continually in the literature.⁹ Unlike the *Vinaya*, which is *externally* enforced, *śīla* refers to the *internally* enforced ethical framework by which the monk or nun structures his or her life.¹⁰ Taken in this light, we can see that *śīla* is an incredibly rich concept for understanding individual ethical conduct. Thus, as Fu points out, with respect to *śīla* and *Vinaya*:

Hirakawa's analysis of the two words seems to have enormous significance for Buddhist ethics.

Our present inquiry into the essential meaning of Buddhist ethics and morality, to address the task of its constructive modernization, demands that we give serious consideration to the means for maintaining a balance between autonomy (*śīla*) [sic], expressing the inner spirit of Dharma, and the heteronomous norms or precepts (*vinaya*) of the Buddhist order.¹¹

Although the *Sūtravibhaṅga* and its paracanonical precursor, the *Prātimokṣa* (that portion of the *Vinaya Piṭaka* devoted to precepts for the individual monks and nuns), contain many rules reflective of significant ethical awareness and concern, is it appropriate to identify the *Sūtravibhaṅga* as an exclusively

ethical document? If we could establish that the canonical *Vinaya* texts, of which the *Sūtravibhaṅga* is a critical part, have their basis in the precepts of *śīla*, then such an argument might be well taken. In this regard, one of the pioneers of comparative *Prātimokṣa* study, W. Pachow, argues for precisely that position in asserting that the Buddhist disciplinary code was little more than an embellishment of the traditional, widely known, and *quite early, pañcaśīla* or five ethical precepts. Pachow says,

It would not be unreasonable to say that the code of discipline of the *Samgha* is but an enlarged edition of the *Pañcaśīla* which have been adopted by the Buddhists and the Jains from the Brāhmanical ascetics. And under various circumstances, they have developed subsidiary rules in order to meet various requirements on various occasions. Thus appears to us to be the line of development through which the growth of these rules could be explained.¹²

He then attempts to identify a clear developmental relationship between the individual precepts of the *pañcaśīla* and the lesser, secondary rules of the *Prātimokṣa*. Pachow's interesting approach is cited by most scholars researching the problem. Holt, for example, says, "If this hypothesis were absolutely sound, we could somehow relate all of the disciplinary rules in some way to the four *pārājikas* or to the *pañcaśīla*. Unfortunately, we are not able to do this."¹³ Using the Pāli text as the benchmark, 139 of the 227 *Pātimokkha* rules can be explained. Nonetheless, 88 rules *cannot* be reconciled! Undaunted, Pachow simply creates new categories to accommodate them.¹⁴ The problem is further exacerbated by the fact that the *pañcaśīla* largely mirror the rules for Brāhmanical ascetics and Jain monks. Holt summarizes well:

Thus, if we are to argue that the fundamental basis of Buddhist discipline consists of the primary concerns of *śīla*, we would have to admit that the basis of Buddhist discipline is not exclusively Buddhist, nor *śramaṇic*, not even monastic for that matter: not a very satisfying finding.¹⁵

In the beginning of his important chapter on "Aspects of *Śīla*" in *The Nature of Buddhist Ethics*,

Damien Keown clearly identifies the impact of the above argument: "Overall, there seems to be no reason to assume that the *Vinaya* is either derived from a simpler set of moral principles or founded upon a single underlying principle or rationale."¹⁶ The remarks of Holt and Keown mirror what I said rather directly in 1980: the "*Prātimokṣa* is not just monastic 'glue' holding the saṃgha together, but the common ground on which the internally enforced life of *śīla* is manifested externally in the community."¹⁷ More recently, and aggressively, Lambert Schmithausen has made the same point. He notes, "The *Vinaya* is not concerned, primarily, with morality proper but rather with the internal harmony and external reputation of the Order."¹⁸ He goes on to say, "One of the main purposes of the *Pātimokkha* (though some of its prohibitions do also refer to morality proper) is no doubt, besides internal harmony, the correct and decorous behaviour of the Order and its members in society."¹⁹ If Upāli's recitation of the first council of Rājagāha has as much to do with communal administration and conduct as it does with individual moral behavior, and if the canonical *Vinaya Piṭaka*, even in the *Sūtravibhaṅga*, devotes more than one-third of its regulations to matters that could at best be referred to as *etiquette*, where, if anywhere in the Buddhist canon, can we find a fuller exegesis of *śīla*, acknowledged to be a more comprehensive, apt, and better descriptive term for Buddhist ethical concerns than *Vinaya*? Further, although the commentarial tradition associated with the *Vinaya* presents an immense literature in Pāli, replete with *ṭīkāṣ*, *sub-ṭīkāṣ*, and the like, it remains somewhat limited in scope with regard to more modern issues.²⁰ Thus, it becomes necessary to question whether it is possible for the textual material on *śīla* to be functional in a transtemporal and transcultural fashion?

If we acknowledge that the most general and consistent treatment of ethics in Buddhism is revealed by its expositions on *śīla*, then it also becomes critical for an accurate understanding of Buddhist ethics to ask the question clearly put by Winston King in 1964: "What is the relation of ethics to the total structure of Buddhist doctrine and practice, particularly with regard to the definition of moral values, their metaphysical status if any, and the nature of ultimate sanctions."²¹ The traditional way of expressing King's question considers the

relationship between the three aspects of the eightfold path, *śīla*, *samādhi*, and *prajñā*, and their connection to *nirvāṇa*. Damien Keown reviews several longstanding notions on how these soteriological elements relate.²²

Keown first cites the most common view that *śīla* leads to *samādhi* which leads to *prajñā*, and that *prajñā* is identified with *nirvāṇa*. In this context, the ethical concerns expressed by *śīla* are at best subsidiary to the others, and are generally thought to be *transcended* with the attainment of *nirvāṇa*. Secondly, it may be argued that ethical enterprise may facilitate enlightenment, and following the attainment of *nirvāṇa*, once again become operative. Thirdly, ethics and knowledge (i.e., *prajñā*) may *both* be present in the attainment of the final goal.

About his review Keown concludes:

The three possibilities outlined above represent very different visions of the role of ethics in the Buddhist soteriological programme. In the first two cases, which I have bracketed together, ethics is extrinsic to *nibbāna*, dispensable, and subsidiary to *paññā*. In the third it is intrinsic to *nibbāna*, essential, and equal in value to *paññā*.²³

Although the prevailing viewpoint in Buddhist scholarship has tended toward a utilitarian conclusion on the issue of *śīla*, especially with regard to Theravāda studies, and despite the contrariness of Mahāyāna-based testimony, an ever-increasing volume of new scholarship has rejected the so-called "transcendancy thesis," in favor of a more valued role for those practices collected under the categorical term *śīla*.²⁴ In so doing, it becomes possible to consider those principles categorized as *śīla* collectively, as a synthetic reflection of *both* *nikāya* Buddhism and Mahāyāna, and perhaps to at least reconsider, and at most dispel, such notions as *śīla* representing a purely mundane goal, largely considered as the highest pursuit for the laity, and practiced by monks and nuns only as a preparation for *samādhi*. If we summarize the relationship between *śīla*, *samādhi*, and *prajñā*, it becomes possible to delineate a clear and precise connection:

The fact that the Eightfold Path begins with *śīla* does not mean that morality is only a preliminary stage. The Eightfold Path begins with *śīla* but ends with *śīla* and *paññā*. *Śīla* is the

starting point since human nature is so constituted that moral discipline (*sīla*) facilitates intellectual discipline (*paññā*). Until correct attitudes, habits, and dispositions have been inculcated it is easy to fall prey to speculative views and opinions of all kinds. This does not mean that there is a direct line leading through *sīla* to *paññā*, or that morality is merely a means of limbering up for the intellectual athlete. No: morality is taken up first but constantly cultivated alongside insight until the two fuse in the transformation of the entire personality in the existential realisation of selflessness.²⁵

Finally, the author of the above quotation integrates the role of *samādhi* in the progression as well. He says, "In the scheme of the Eightfold Path, *samādhi* stands between *sīla* and *paññā* and supplements them both. It is a powerful technique for the acceleration of ethical and intellectual developments towards their perfection in *nibbāna*."²⁶

Having established the efficacy of *sīla* rather than *Vinaya* as the primary and most essential category of inquiry for matters pertinent to the ethical tradition in Buddhism, and having established *sīla* as critical throughout the Buddhist path to enlightenment *and after its attainment*, we can now proceed to an examination of the *Sūtra*, and to a lesser extent, *Abhidharma* literature fundamental to the *sīla* tradition.

The clearest and most detailed exposition of *sīla* in the Pāli Canon can be found in the first thirteen suttas of the *Dīgha Nikāya*, a section collectively referred to as the *Sīlakkhandhavagga*. The first, and perhaps most important of these thirteen texts cited above, is the *Brahmajāla-sutta* or the "Discourse on Brahma's Net." The preliminary, critical portion of this text is divided into three sections termed, respectively, the short (*cūḷa*), medium (*majjhima*), and long (*mahā*) divisions. These three sections occur in *each of the thirteen suttas of the Sīlakkhandhavagga!* Thomas W. Rhys Davids, in the notes to his translation of these sections of the *Dīgha Nikāya*, refers to them as the "*Sīla Vagga*," and says that "the tract itself must almost certainly have existed as a separate work before the time when the discourses, in each of which it recurs, were first put together."²⁷ The

short tract (as Rhys Davids calls the division) contains 26 items of moral conduct, the medium tract 10, and the long tract 7, and while *each* tract is important for understanding the developing notion of Buddhist morality, it is the *short tract* that is most critical. Compared to the various codes of precepts that have become the standard of proper Buddhist conduct, namely, the (in Pāli) *pañcasīla* (five precepts), *aṭṭhaṅgasīla* (eight precepts), *dasasīla* (ten precepts), *dasakusalakammaṭṭha* (ten good paths of action), and *Pātimokkha* (formal monastic disciplinary code), one can correlate four of the five *pañcasīla* to the short tract, seven of the eight *aṭṭhaṅgasīla*, nine of the ten *dasasīla*, seven of the ten *dasakusalakammaṭṭha*, and, as we have seen above, 139 of the 227 offenses of the *Pātimokkha*. This close correspondence is important because ". . . the conduct of the ideal *samaṇa* as defined in the *Short Tract* becomes the foundation of Buddhist ethics."²⁸ Although the *Brahmajāla-sutta* is possibly the clearest exposition of all the discourses in the *Sīla Vagga*, a number of other texts are also especially important for understanding *sīla* in a contextual framework consistent with Buddhist soteriology. The *Sāmaññaphala-sutta* or "Discourse on the Fruits of the Religious Life," for example, links the practice of *sīla* to meditative attainment, destruction of the imperfections known as *āsavas* (usually translated as "outflows" or "cankers"), and the achievement of arhant hood. The famous eightfold path, with its division into *sīla*, *samādhi*, and *paññā*, is mentioned in the *Mahāli-sutta* ("Discourse to Mahāli") and the *Kassapasīhanāda-sutta* ("Discourse on the Lion's Roar to Kassapa"). Nor should we conclude that ethicality is not emphasized in the other parts of the canon, as the *Maṅgala-sutta* of the *Khuddaka Nikāya*, *Metta-sutta* of the *Suttanipāta*, and *Sigālovāda-sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya* are among the most important Theravāda texts on this subject.

It would also be incorrect to presume *sīla* as topically important only in the *sūtras*. It is also of much interest to *Abhidharma* and later commentarial authors as well. Nowhere is this more plainly visible than the Theravādin *Abhidhamma*, the first text of which (i.e., the *Dhammasaṅgāṇī*) classifies mental elements around a markedly ethical base. According to G.S.P. Misra, to *Puggalapaññatti* as well "deals with the task of the

classification of human types in which ethical consideration, among others, is the most dominant principle."²⁹ Anuruddha's *Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha* offers a list of 14 immoral and 19 moral mental constituents (*cetasikas*).³⁰ Additionally, ethical concerns abound in the appropriate sections of Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimagga* and virtually throughout the *Milindapañha*. In the Sarvāstivādin tradition too, 28 of the 46 *caittas* have clear ethical import: 10 positive mental constituents known as *kuśala-mahābhūmika-dharmas* and 18 negative mental constituents (composed of 6 *kleśas* or defilements, 2 *akuśala-mahābhūmika-dharmas* or universally bad elements, and 10 *upakleśas* or secondary defilements).³¹ The ethical considerations in Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa* are simply too numerous to cite. What it boils down to is this: "The *Abhidharma* posits two classes of mental forces which produce either defilement or purification of the mind."³²

How does the above present a consistent, harmonious picture for the early Buddhist? In the *Kassapaśihanāda-sutta*, Buddha says, of his own ethical attainment:

Now there are some recluses and Brahmans, Kassapa, who lay emphasis on conduct. They speak, in various ways, in praise of morality. But so far as regards the really noble, the highest conduct, I am aware of no one who is equal to myself, much less superior. And it is I who have gone the furthest therein; that is, in the highest conduct (of the Path).³³

Of course the Pāli word utilized to indicate "highest conduct" is *adhisīla*. The implication of Buddha's statement is clear enough: Buddha's attainment was unquestionably motivated by compassion and fueled by moral development of the highest order, but also that *the attainment of Buddhahood (or, for that matter, arhantship) does not preclude ethical propriety*. No doubt the cultivation of meditational attainment, as we indicated earlier, bridges the proverbial gap between *sīla* and *paññā*, and not only does this suggest that meditational experience has serious impact on the moral life, but also that "*Sīla* is a central feature of the conduct of the enlightened. . . ."³⁴ Keown notes that "the *Arahat* certainly has not gone beyond *kusala*, and *kusala* is the term which *par excellence* denotes ethical goodness."³⁵ Ethical goodness, as manifested by Buddha or *any* serious

practitioner, is a reflection of his sympathy (*anukampā*) for all sentient beings and manifested by cultivation of the four *Brahmavihāras* or "Divine Abodes," as Aronson has amply demonstrated.³⁶

If the above paragraph demonstrates that Buddhist ethical development takes its inspiration from Buddha's personal example, it is not unreasonable to conclude about the Buddha, as Lal Mani Joshi does, that:

His love of solitude and silence was matched only by his universal compassion towards the suffering creatures. Hīnayāna seems to have laid emphasis on the former while Mahāyāna on the latter aspect of the Buddha's personality and ideal.³⁷

Such an approach lead Joshi and others to identify the ethical approach of the Buddhist *nikāyas* as narrower and more limited in scope than Mahāyāna. About Mahāyāna, Joshi remarks, "Its aim is higher, its outlook broader, and its aspiration more sublime than that of Hīnayāna."³⁸ One should not read Joshi's evaluation too aggressively, or as a rejection of the earlier understanding of *śīla*, but rather as what Keown aptly calls a "paradigm shift."³⁹ This paradigm shift is of course reflected by the Mahāyāna emphasis on the *bodhisattva* ideal.

Nalinaksha Dutt, in his still important *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and Its Relation to Hīnayāna*, notes that the Chinese pilgrim I-ching "who was chiefly interested in the *Vinaya*, remarks that the Mahāyānists had no *Vinaya* of their own and that theirs was the same as that of the Hīnayānists."⁴⁰ Dutt, however, goes on to list a large number of Mahāyāna *sūtras* that deal with ethical issues, including the *Bodhisattvacaryānirdeśa*, *Bodhisattva-prātimokṣa-sūtra*, *Bhikṣu Vinaya*, *Ākāśagarbha-sūtra*, *Upālipariṣchā-sūtra*, *Ugradattapariṣchā-sūtra*, *Ratnamegha-sūtra*, and *Ratnarāśi-sūtra*.⁴¹ Of these, the *Bodhisattva-prātimokṣa-sūtra* and the *Upālipariṣchā-sūtra* are clearly the best known. The former was edited by Dutt and published in *Indian Historical Quarterly*, 7 (1931), pp. 259-286, but to my knowledge, has never been translated into English. It is a *sūtra* only in name, comprised primarily of fragments taken from the *Upālipariṣchā-sūtra* and the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*.⁴² Nonetheless, it is *not* a code of monastic rules for

bodhisattvas, as its name implies, but rather a general ethical guide for both lay and monastic *bodhisattvas*. The *Upāliparipṛcchā-sūtra* has benefitted from the fine scholarly translation of Pierre Python.⁴³

There is little doubt that at least three major texts form the basis of Mahāyāna ethics: the (1) (Mahāyāna) *Brahmajāla-sūtra*, an apocryphal Chinese work⁴⁴ (2) *Śikṣāsamuccaya* of Śāntideva, and (3) *Bodhicaryāvatāra* of Śāntideva. The *Śikṣāsamuccaya* was of sufficient importance to prompt Joshi to state, "The fundamental principle of Mahāyāna morality is expressed in the first verse of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*: 'When to myself as to my fellow-beings, fear and pain are hateful, what justification is there that I protect my own self and not others?'"⁴⁵ Structurally, the text is organized into three parts, beginning with twenty-seven *kārikās* outlining the ethical ideal of the *bodhisattva*. A second part offers an extensive commentary on these verses, with the third part offering a huge compendium of supporting quotations from additional Buddhist texts. Taken collectively, its three parts form a comprehensive statement on *bodhisattva* ethics. The *Bodhicaryāvatāra* is possibly the best known Mahāyāna text associated with the conduct of the *bodhisattva*. It is arranged in ten chapters, five of which address the *pāramitās*, but with mindfulness (*smṛti*) and awareness (*saṃprajanya*) substituted for the traditional *dāna* and *śīla*. This does not mean to say that the *śīla-pāramitā* is omitted, for Chapter V, Verse 11 mentions it by name.⁴⁶ Specifically ethical concerns are also considered in Chapter II, known as "*Pāpa-deśanā*" or "Confession of Evil." Overall, an incredible breadth and scope of ethical issues are considered.

Curiously, it is not from these famous Mahāyāna ethical texts alone that we find the key which unlocks the major emphasis of *bodhisattva* conduct. Two further texts are critically important here: the *Mahāyānasamgraha* and the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, and it is on the basis of their evidence that many authors, Buddhist and otherwise, have advanced the theory of the superiority of Mahāyāna ethics over that of *nikāya* Buddhism. In fact, the tenth or "ethical" chapter of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* was the focus of a complete translation and study by Mark Tatz.⁴⁷

Keown, in *The Nature of Buddhist Ethics* (pp. 135-157), provides an extremely careful exposition of

the argument. The *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* suggests that Mahāyāna morality is superior to Hīnayāna in four ways:

(1) in its classifications (*prabheda-viśeṣa*), (2) in its common and separate rules (*sādhāraṇa-asādhāraṇa-sīkṣāvśeṣa*), (3) in breadth (*vaipulya-viśeṣa*), and (4) in depth (*gāmbhīrya-viśeṣa*).⁴⁸

The first category is the most important of the four since it supports the other three, and is itself composed of three sections: (a) morality as temperance (*saṃvara-śīla*), (b) morality as the pursuit of good (*kuśala-dharma-saṃgrāhaka-śīla*), and (c) morality as altruism (*sattva-artha-kriyā-śīla*).⁴⁹ The threefold categorization of morality as temperance, the pursuit of good, and altruism is further developed by the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, concluding that it is the element of altruism that enables Mahāyāna morality to surpass its *nikāya* Buddhist counterpart. The extreme importance of the issue of altruism in asserting the superiority of Mahāyāna ethics has not gone unnoticed by modern Theravādins. Walpola Rahula, for example, says,

The *bhikkhu* is not a selfish, cowardly individual thinking only of his happiness and salvation, unmindful of whatever happens to the rest of humanity. A true *bhikkhu* is an altruistic, heroic person who considers others' happiness more than his own. He, like the Bodhisattva Sumedha, will renounce his own *nirvāṇa* for the sake of others. Buddhism is built upon service to others.⁵⁰

Other Theravādin authors echo Rahula's sentiment.⁵¹ Regarding the specific conduct of *bodhisattvas*, the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* postulates a code having fifty-two rules, of which only the first four are categorized (as *pārājayika-sthāniyā-dharmā*) and a number of which allow the violation of (some of) the ten good paths of action. The second category explores the differentiation between serious and minor offenses, emphasizing that while both *bodhisattvas* and *śrāvakas* are enjoined to observe all the major rules of conduct, *bodhisattvas* may breach minor matters of deportment while *śrāvakas* may not. Of course the circumstances under which a *bodhisattva* may engage in this kind of behavior are also stated. The third category is essentially a summary. Finally, the fourth category is the most innovative, focusing on the notion of skill-in-means (*upāya-kauśalya*) in

relation to Mahāyāna ethics.

In the fourth chapter of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, one reads "The son of the Conqueror, having grasped the Thought of Enlightenment firmly, must make every effort, constantly and alertly, not to transgress the discipline (*śikṣā*)."⁵² In the next chapter: "Thus enlightened, one ought to be constantly active for the sake of others. Even that which generally is forbidden is allowed to the one who understands the work of compassion."⁵³ How can these two conflicting views appear in the same text, and in such close proximity? The answer lies in a proper understanding of *upāya-kauśalya* and its role in Mahāyāna ethics: it is a theme that permeates Śāntideva's writings. Throughout the eighth chapter of the *Śikṣāsāmauccaya* on "Purification from Sin" (*Pāpasōdhanam*), citations abound, especially from the *Upāliparipṛchā-sūtra* and the *Upāyakauśalya-sūtra*, in which ethical transgressions are allowed and sanctioned in the name of skill-in-means.⁵⁴ Keown concludes from all these examples "that the freedom allowed to a *bodhisattva* is enormous and a wide spectrum of activities are permitted to him, even to the extent of taking life."⁵⁵ He goes on, however, to say:

When actions of these kinds are performed there are usually two provisos which must be satisfied: (a) that the prohibited action will conduce to the greater good of those beings directly affected by it; and (b) that the action is performed on the basis of perfect knowledge (*prajñā*) or perfect compassion (*karuṇā*).⁵⁶

The relationship between *śīla* and *prajñā* in Mahāyāna is thus parallel to that noted above with respect to *nikāya* Buddhism in which it was remarked that "the two fuse in the transformation of the entire personality in the existential realisation of selflessness" (see note 27). What seems *not to be parallel* is that the *nikāya* Buddhist adept is at no time allowed to breach the practice of proper morality while the Mahāyāna *bodhisattva* may, under certain circumstances invariably linked to altruistic activities and based on *karuṇā*, *upāya-kauśalya*, and *prajñā*, transcend conventional morality. G.S.P. Misra, for example, notices that, "In the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* we find an enumeration of the circumstances under which a *Bodhisattva* may justifiably commit transgressions of

the moral precepts; the governing factor, however, is always compassion and a desire to save others from sinful acts."⁵⁷ The above passages notwithstanding, parallel references can be also found⁵⁸ emphasizing a strict observance of the precepts for *bodhisattvas*. As a result, we find ourselves confused over the apparent incongruity in the textual accounts of Mahāyāna ethical conduct, and wondering just how breaches of conventional ethical behavior are sanctioned.

The solution emerges from the postulation of two uniquely *different* types of *upāya-kauśalya*. About the first, which he categorizes as normative ethics and calls *upāya₁*, Keown says:

Upāya₁ does not enjoin laxity in moral practice but rather the greater recognition of the needs and interests of others. One's moral practice is now for the benefit of oneself and others by means of example. Through its emphasis on *karuṇā* the Mahāyāna gave full recognition to the value of ethical perfection, making it explicit that ethics and insight were of equal importance for a *bodhisattva*.⁵⁹

The second type of *upāya* has nothing to do with normative ethics or ordinary individuals. It is the province of those who have already perfected ethics and insight. Thus:

...it is the *upāya* of *bodhisattvas* of the seventh stage (*upāya-kauśalya-bhūmi*) and beyond, whose powers and perfections are supernatural. *Upāya₂* is depicted as an activity of the Buddhas and Great *Bodhisattvas* (*Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas*) and it is only they who have the knowledge and power to use it. It is by virtue of *upāya₂* that *bodhisattvas* transgress the precepts from motives of compassion and are said to do no wrong.⁶⁰

There can be little doubt that *upāya₂* is *not* the model by which ordinary beings perfect themselves but rather the pragmatic moral outcome of the attainment of the seventh stage of the *bodhisattva* path. *Upāya₂* is the social expression of a genuine understanding of the notion of emptiness (*śūnyatā*) in which no precepts can even be theorized. It is emphasized throughout the Mahāyāna literature on emptiness, but nowhere as eloquently as in

the discourse between Vimalakīrti and Upāli in the third chapter of the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra*:

Reverend Upāli, all things are without production, destruction, and duration, like magical illusions, clouds, and lightning; all things are evanescent, not remaining even for an instant; all things are like dreams, hallucinations, and unreal visions; all things are like the reflection of the moon in water and like a mirror-image; they are born of mental construction. Those who know this are called the true upholders of the discipline, and those disciplined in that way are indeed well disciplined.⁶¹

As such, it represents the far extreme of the ethical continuum, a Buddhist situation ethics established not simply on love, as in Fletcher's system, but on the highest and most profound manifestation of compassion.

Having concluded in the above pages that *śīla* is operative throughout the individual's progress on the *nikāya* Buddhist path, even after the attainment of *prajñā*, and that the same claim can be made for Mahāyāna, enhanced by the altruistic utilization of *upāya*₁ up to the attainment of the seventh *bodhisattva* stage, after which *upāya*₂ becomes operative, albeit in rather antinomian fashion, it now becomes important to address the issue of whether textually based Buddhist ethics can be truly current; whether an ethical tradition solidly grounded on the textual heritage can serve as the foundational basis for a socially engaged Buddhism, effective in addressing the complex concerns cited in the growing literature on the subject.

The relative vitality of Buddhist ethics in today's world is a concern that cannot be minimized. Indeed, Kōshō Mizutani, in the *Prologue to Buddhist Ethics and Modern Society* asserts, "I submit that a study of Buddhism that emphasizes its ethical aspects will be the most important task facing Buddhists in the twenty-first century."⁶² Studies abound stressing the difficulties of living effectively in a postmodern society that is becoming increasingly pluralistic and secular. This dilemma is further exacerbated for Buddhists in that "Buddhists today face the question not only of how to relate to other religions, but also how to relate to other forms of Buddhism from different traditions."⁶³

In 1987, Rick Fields delivered a paper on "The Future of American Buddhism" to a conference entitled "Buddhism and Christianity: Toward the Human Future," held at the Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley, California. Although case specific to the American Buddhist situation, Fields concluded his presentation with a sketch of eight features that he felt would be critical in the on-going development of American Buddhism. All eight points were directly or indirectly related to issues of Buddhist ethics, prompting Fields to comment: "The Bodhisattva notions of direct involvement in the world will tend to overshadow tendencies towards renunciation and withdrawal. Buddhist ethics, as reflected in the precepts, the paramitas, and the Bodhisattva vow, will be applied to the specific problems of day-to-day living in contemporary urban North America."⁶⁴ It is difficult to consider Fields' words, and those of similar, like-minded individuals such as the contributors to works in the genre of *The Path of Compassion* edited by Fred Eppsteiner without feeling much sympathy for the predicament facing Buddhists in Asia and America as they try to confront ethical dilemmas directly. Consequently, when we read articles by Sulak Sivaraksa, Thich Nhat Hanh, Jack Kornfield, Joanna Macy and others we must commend them for the depth of their sincerity and commitment, the expanse of the timely issues they confront, and *wonder why there is rarely a footnote, hardly a textual reference in their writings* which might provide additional and persuasive authority to their arguments.

In an exciting article, drawing heavily on the work of recent biblical scholarship, Harold Coward points out that:

The relationship between a religious community and its scripture is complex, reciprocal and usually central to the normative self-definition of a religion. The awareness of this relationship is the result of postmodern approaches that no longer see scriptures as museum pieces for historical critical analysis, but recognize them to be the products of human perception and interaction--both in their own time and in today's study by scholars.⁶⁵

The problem of precisely how ethical guidelines can be appropriately reinterpreted in the context of changing times and cultures was confronted early on in Buddhist religious history. By including only the presumed words

of Buddha, referred to as *Buddhavacana*, within a closed canon, *nikāya* Buddhism in general and Theravāda in particular made a clear statement about the relationship of community and scripture in the early tradition. Mahāyāna chose the opposite approach. As Coward points out: "Rather than closing off the canon as the *Theravāda* school had done, *Mahāyāna* maintained an open approach and added to the 'remembered words' of Ananda new *sūtras* such as the *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras* and the *Lotus Sūtra*."⁶⁶ This openness allowed Buddhists the occasion to utilize Buddha's own approach in transmitting the substance of his teaching if not his exact words. Robinson and Johnson point this out clearly in *The Buddhist Religion*: "Both strictness in preserving the essential kernel and liberty to expand, vary, and embellish the expression characterize Buddhist attitudes through the ages toward not only texts but also art, ritual, discipline, and doctrine. The perennial difficulty lies in distinguishing the kernel from its embodiment."⁶⁷

The openness in creating new scripture emphasized by Mahāyāna, and the utilization of an on-going commentarial tradition, as fostered by earlier Buddhism, conjointly provide the potential for a profoundly *current* Buddhist ethics that is also *textually grounded*. Such an approach is solidly in keeping with the program outlined by Charles Wei-hsun Fu (in a slightly different context). Fu says, "The Buddhist view of ethics and morality must be presented in the context of open discussion in a free and democratic forum."⁶⁸ To be successful, it requires that:

A philosophical reinterpretation of the Middle Way of *paramārtha-satya/samvṛṭi-satya* must be undertaken so that the original gap between these two can be firmly bridged, thereby accomplishing the task of constructive modernization of Buddhist ethics and morality. On the theoretical level, a new ethical theory based on the Middle Way of *paramārtha-satya/samvṛṭi-satya* can meet the challenge of modern times. . .⁶⁹

When I wrote *American Buddhism*, I suggested that much of the future of Buddhism in the 1970s, or for that matter, in longer term perspective, would be dependent on the changing face of American religious life in

general. This is especially important in examining Buddhism's situation with regard to everyday life. By the late 1970s, America was in the throes of severe social anomie, largely fueled by the vast ethical uncertainty that gripped the cultural *and* religious landscape. At that time, I maintained that Buddhism's traditional view of *Vinaya* and *śīla*, monastic and individual guidelines for everyday, institutional and ethical conduct, was grossly ineffective and needed serious commentary and reform. I believe that significant reform is now taking place in American Buddhist communities. Needless to say, in this short context, I cannot pursue the many, varied ways Theravāda, Mahāyāna, and Vajrayāna Buddhist groups in America are specifically engaging the ancient tradition in a new dialogue that elevates precepts beyond a facile understanding merely as *śikṣā*, as rigid regulations. Such an exposition would require an elucidation of new approaches to the literature so as to provide a result that is truly transtemporal and transcultural. In his earlier mentioned 1987 paper Fields also commented Buddhism's future in America was intimately tied up with its ability to develop a *Vinaya* for lay people, its concern for promoting a just and compassionate society, and its regard for identifying an ethical pattern for women.⁷⁰ Fields is by no means the first to say this⁷¹, but he is absolutely correct in his assertion.

In the three decades that I have been writing about Buddhism in America, I have consistently argued that since the vast majority of Buddhists in this country were members of the laity, for Buddhism to be truly American, it would need to address the dilemma of tailoring the *major emphasis* of Buddhist practice to lay rather than monastic life. Initially, the suggestion was rather widely and aggressively attacked by what seemed to me like most of the Buddhists groups in America. The substance of the critique presumed that I ignored the monastic *sangha*, the very basis and foundation of Buddhist community life. Of course I did nothing of the kind. I simply acknowledged what Buddhists in Asia have recognized for more than two millennia. Most practitioners, for an enormous variety of entirely valid reasons, cannot make the full and complete commitment to the rigorous practice associated with monastic life. That doesn't mean we should *ignore* the monastic tradition, or *exclude it from American Buddhist life*, but rather that we provide the context for all Buddhists in America to

practice in a fashion appropriate to their choice of approach. In so doing, we would simply be following, and perhaps adapting, an Asian Buddhist model predicated on the notion that there have always been more members of the laity than members of the monastic tradition, but that both endeavors needed to be affirmed and endorsed for the successful development of Buddhist religious life. Such an approach has not always been clear in the popular literature.

In Spring 1992, the *Tricycle* editorial observed that "Just now, ours is not predominantly a Buddhism of removed monasticism. It is out of robes, in the streets, in institutions, workplaces, and homes."⁷² The editorial closed with this remark: "While Buddhist history is steeped in monasticism, our own democratic traditions compel us to share the burden of social problems."⁷³ For some Buddhists in this country, monastic and otherwise, the above comments may be perceived as highly inflammatory, possibly even reflective of a rejection of the entire monastic vocation. To be sure, American Buddhism might redefine somewhat the nature of the symbiosis between the two main component groups of the Buddhist *sangha*, but neither enterprise would ever be disparaged by the other. In Don Morreale's 1988 volume *Buddhist America*, Jack Kornfield called the same process *integration*, and along with democratization and feminism, considered it one of three major themes in North American Buddhism.⁷⁴ So, within a decade, many writers, mostly identified with non-ethnic American Buddhism, had begun to echo my own sentiment. No one, however, has made the argument so eloquently, and with such awareness of the complexity of the task, as Rita Gross, in her extremely important book *Buddhism After Patriarchy*.⁷⁵ Gross recognizes that what she refers to as "monasticism after patriarchy," while understanding that new and vital archetypes must replace Buddhism's current "very weak models for meaningful lay life," must forge new monastic paradigms that are androgynous and free of prejudice or discrimination.⁷⁶ The movement to a truly post-patriarchal monastic tradition is at least as threatening to traditional Buddhism in Asia as to the conflict between the "Two Buddhisms" in America, and of course Gross argues persuasively for an androgynous lay Buddhism as well. Additionally, Gross identifies, addresses, *and validates* the emphasis of those Buddhists who are trying to work out an intermediary lifestyle that incorporates

both monastic and lay features into serious, rigorous Buddhist practice.

Associated with the struggle to redefine community life in American Buddhism, accommodating both ethnic and largely non-ethnic groups, is a new emphasis on active expressions of compassion as perhaps the major component of a revitalized Buddhist ethics that has been called "socially engaged Buddhism." In an interesting book titled *Inner Peace, World Peace*,⁷⁷ edited by Kenneth Kraft, the editor provides an interesting survey chapter in which he chronicles many of the activities collected under the above rubric, such as the founding of the Buddhist Peace Fellowship in 1978, Thich Nhat Hanh's many significant endeavors in North America, the Dalai Lama's efforts, and, most importantly, the growing body of literature that has accompanied the effort. Kraft shows how socially engaged Buddhism in America has utilized well-known methods of social action in this culture: voter mobilization, letter writing campaigns, volunteer charity work, tax resistance, product boycotts, and so forth. What is most puzzling here is that one of the major foci of socially engaged Buddhists in the West consists of providing aid and support to *ethnic Buddhist groups*, both here and in Asia, while, with few exceptions, ethnic Buddhists in America seem not to be especially active in the movement.

A creative commentary on Buddhism's attempt to renew its commitment to generating and practicing a revitalized, value-oriented ethical life is the development of Thich Nhat Hanh's "Order of Interbeing," the successor to Vietnam's Tiep Hien Order. It tries to provide a creative (even experimental) individual and collective methodology for the application of Buddhist principles to today's world. The major thrust of the group is to practice the traditional five vows of the laity, in conjunction with fourteen additional precepts that amplify and augment the values underlying the original five. Moreover, Nhat Hanh has struck a careful balance between meditational training and political activism, emphasizing each activity as mutually influencing. In so doing, both ethnic and non-ethnic American Buddhist groups are provided with an agenda for activism that benefits all Buddhists. Despite its clever use of what Fields calls "cross-cultural borrowing" and genuine potential for an honorable rather than politically correct multiculturalism in American Buddhism, this approach has not been uniformly accepted.

One of the most fruitful approaches to understanding the attitudinal differences between ethnic and non-ethnic American Buddhists can be extracted from Kenneth Kraft's work in *Inner Peace, World Peace*. He suggests that Buddhists in Asian and Third World countries are often engaged in serious struggle for political and cultural survival. He notes that "Those involved in such conflicts typically have little interest in the theoretical implications of nonviolence or the latest innovations in spiritual/activist practice."⁷⁸ Most Western Buddhists have never shared that tragic experience; it's a form of suffering they've never experienced. Yet their teachers have. Chögyam Trungpa's *Born in Tibet* remains a chilling testament to the fallout of a world filled with suffering. Thich Thien-an's work with Vietnamese refugees both before and after the fall of Saigon documents how suffering sometimes fosters what one writer called "the exigencies of a major transplantation of human beings to a totally new environment."⁷⁹

Many years ago, in the "Introduction" to my edited 1992 volume *Buddhist Ethics: A Cross-Cultural Approach*, I suggested that Buddhists could look to the synthesis of two traditional ethical frameworks in fulfilling the suggestions noted by Fields: (1) the four *brahmavihāras* or "Divine Abodes," consisting of love (*maitrī*), compassion (*karuṇā*), sympathetic joy (*muditā*), and equanimity (*upekṣā*), and (2) the six *pāramitās* or "perfections," of giving (*dāna*), morality (*śīla*), patience (*kṣānti*), vigor (*vīrya*), meditation (*samādhi*), and wisdom (*prajñā*). Although the *brahmavihāras* are more generally applied to Theravāda thought, and the *pāramitās* to Mahāyāna thought, they might be reinterpreted conjointly through *an entirely new commentarial literature* in reconfiguring a *modern* American Buddhist ethics. In so doing, American Buddhism will arrive at a wisdom that is grounded in equanimity, understanding properly that, "...although fully liberated beings have abandoned all the negative emotions of attachment, hatred, and delusion, they have not destroyed *all* emotion and feeling. They have the ability to develop a whole range of rich and satisfying emotions and are encouraged in scripture to do so."⁸⁰ Consequently, a powerful new ethical tool is developed that stands outside of time and culture.

Not to beg the original question, the above more than argues for the composition of *new* commentarial literature focusing on those significant texts mentioned earlier and including especially, the: 13 suttas identified as the "short tract" (*Sīlakkhandhavagga*) of the *Dīgha Nikāya*, *Maṅgala-sutta*, *Metta-sutta*, *Sigāloovāda-sutta*, *Dhammasaṅgaṇī Puggalapañnatti*, *Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha*, *Visuddhimagga*, and *Milindapañha* of the Theravādin tradition. Mahāyāna texts worthy of new consideration would also include those with the richest heritage of ethical underpinnings, for example, the: *Brahmajāla-sūtra*, *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, *Mahāyānasamgraha*, *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, *Bodhisattva-prātimokṣa-sūtra*, and *Upālipariṣchā-sūtra*. Certainly this does not mean to say that there are no other texts of ethical import for Buddhism, but simply that the ones cited above represent the most fertile, reasonable place from which to begin a new and revitalized textual tradition. The process would be a high expression of what Coward calls "the reciprocal relationship between text and tradition in Buddhism,"⁸¹ a profound demonstration that Buddhist ethics can indeed be meaningfully *current and textually supported*.

Notes

1. Portions of this paper appeared earlier in "Text and Tradition in the Study of Buddhist Ethics," *Pacific World*, NS 9 (1993), 49-68.
2. Charles Wei-hsun Fu and Sandra A. Wawryto (eds.), *Buddhist Ethics and Modern Society* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1991), p.4.
3. Akira Hirakawa, *Studies in Primal Buddhism: The Original Model of the Organization of the Buddhist Order* (Tokyo: Shunshusha Press, 1964), pp. 107-108. In the body of this paper, I regularly present technical terminology in Sanskrit, except when discussing the Theravāda tradition, in which case Pāli terms are utilized.
4. John Holt, *Discipline: The Canonical Buddhism of the Vinayapīṭaka* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1981), p.

3.

5. Ibid., p. 4.

6. Charles Wei-hsun Fu, "From *Paramārtha-satya* to *Samvṛṭi-satya*: An Attempt at Constructive Modernization of (Mahāyāna) Buddhist Ethics," in *Buddhist Ethics and Modern Society*, edited by Charles Wei-hsun Fu and Sandra A. Wawrytko (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 315.

7. See, for example, Charles S. Prebish, "The Prātimokṣa Puzzle: Fact Versus Fantasy," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 94, 2 (April-June, 1974), pp. 168-176. Holt, *Discipline: The Canonical Buddhism of the Vinayapīṭaka*, p. 125 makes the same point.

8. See Henry Clarke Warren and Dharmananda Kosambi (eds.), *Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosācariya* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950), p.7 (Chapter I.19), and Louis de La Vallée Poussin (tr.), *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu* (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1924), Vol. 3, p. 47 (Chapter IV.16a-b).

9. For example, see Charles S. Prebish, *Buddhist Monastic Discipline: The Sanskrit Prātimokṣa Sūtras of the Mahāsāṃghikas and Mūlasarvāstivādins* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1975), p.

42. The text reads:

śīlena yuktośramaṇo tireti śīlena yukto brāhmaṇo tireti /

śīlena yukto naradevapūjyo śīlena yuktasya hi prātimokṣaṃ //

10. See Charles S. Prebish, *American Buddhism* (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1979), p. 45.

11. Fu, "From *Paramārtha-satya* to *Samvṛṭi-satya*: An Attempt at Constructive Modernization of (Mahāyāna) Buddhist Ethics", p. 315.

12. W. Pachow, *A Comparative Study of the Prātimokṣa* (Santiniketan: Sino-Indian Cultural Society, 1955), p. 37.
13. Holt, *Discipline: The Canonical Buddhism of the Vinayapiṭaka*, p. 64. Keown, in *The Nature of Buddhist Ethics*, p. 33, notices the same dilemma.
14. Pachow, *A Comparative Study of the Prātimokṣa*, Appendix I, pp. 1-2.
15. Holt, *Discipline: The Canonical Buddhism of the Vinayapiṭaka*, p. 65.
16. Damien Keown, *The Nature of Buddhist Ethics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), p. 34.
17. Charles S. Prebish, "Vinaya and Prātimokṣa: The Foundation of Buddhist Ethics," in *Studies in the History of Buddhism*, edited by A.K. Narain (Delhi: B.R. Publishing Corporation, 1980), p. 248.
18. Lambert Schmithausen, *Buddhism and Nature* (Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies 1991), *Studia Philologica Buddhica Occasional Paper Series*, 7, p. 43.
19. Lambert Schmithausen, *The Problem of the Sentience of Plants in Earliest Buddhism* (Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1991), *Studia Philologica Buddhica Monograph Series*, 6, p. 16.
20. Charles Prebish (ed.), *Buddhist Ethics: A Cross-Cultural Approach* (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt, 1992), p. vii.
21. Winston King, *In the Hope of Nibbana* (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1964), p. v.
22. Keown, *The Nature of Buddhist Ethics*, pp. 8-23.

23. Ibid., pp. 10-11.

24. Here I have in mind especially the work of Harvey Aronson, *Love and Sympathy in Theravāda Buddhism* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980) and Nathan Katz, *Buddhist Images of Human Perfection* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982).

25. Keown, *The Nature of Buddhist Ethics*, pp. 111-112.

26. Ibid., p. 76.

27. Thomas W. Rhys Davids (tr.) *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Part I (London: Luzac & Co., Ltd., 1899), pp. 3-4, note 1.

28. Keown, *The Nature of Buddhist Ethics*, p. 29.

29. G.S.P. Misra, *Development of Buddhist Ethics* (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1984), p. 67.

30. See Shwe Zan Aung (tr.), *Compendium of Philosophy* (London: Luzac & Co., Ltd., 1910), pp. 95-97.

31. See, for example, Th. Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word "Dharma,"* 2nd ed. (Calcutta: Susil Gupta, 1956), pp. 84-86.

32. Keown, *The Nature of Buddhist Ethics*, p. 81.

33. Thomas W. Rhys Davids (tr.), *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Part I, p. 237.

34. Keown, *The Nature of Buddhist Ethics*, p. 112.

35. Ibid., p. 124.

36. Aronson, *Love and Sympathy in Theravāda Buddhism*. See especially pp. 3-10 on "Buddha's Sympathy," 11-23 on "Disciples' Sympathy," 60-77 on "The Sublime Attitudes," and 78-96 on "Equanimity."
37. Lal Mani Joshi, *Studies in the Buddhistic Culture of India*, 2nd revised ed. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977), p. 91.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 93.
39. Keown, *The Nature of Buddhist Ethics*, p. 130.
40. Nalinaksha Dutt, *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and Its Relation to Hīnayāna* (London: Luzac & Co., 1930), p. 290.
41. *Ibid.*, pp. 290-291.
42. Nalinaksha Dutt, "Bodhisattva Prātimokṣa Sūtra," *Indian Historical Quarterly*, 7 (1931), p. 261.
43. See Pierre Python (tr.), *Vinaya-Viniścaya-Upāli-Paripṛcchā* (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1973), which offers Tibetan (with Sanskrit fragments) and Chinese text along with a French translation of the Chinese (taken from *Taishō* 310, 325, 326, and 1582). Python notes on page 1 that the Sanskrit fragments are taken from Dutt's edition of the *Bodhisattva-prātimokṣa-sūtra*. Python's text is an entirely different text than Valentina Stache-Rosen (tr.) *Upāliparipṛcchāsūtra: Ein Text zur buddhistischen Ordensdisziplin* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1984), which offers a translation from Chinese (*Taishō* 1466) with parallels to the Pāli.
44. See, for example, James R. Ware, "Notes on the Fan Wang Ching," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 1,

1 (April, 1936), pp. 156-161. Paul Groner makes a similar case, in Robert E. Buswell, Jr. (ed.), *Chinese Buddhist Apocrypha* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990), pp. 251ff.

45. Joshi, *Studies in the Buddhistic Culture of India*, p. 93. The Sanskrit reads:

yadā mama pareṣāṃ ca bhayaṃ duḥkham ca na priyam /

tadātmanaḥ ko viśeṣo yattāṃ rakṣāmi netaram //

46. See Marion Matics (tr.), *Entering the Path of Enlightenment* (London: Macmillan, 1970), p. 163.

47. See Mark Tatz, *The Complete Bodhisattva: Asanga's Chapter on Ethics with the Commentary by Tsong-kha-pa, The Basic Path to Awakening* (Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1987).

48. Keown, *The Nature of Buddhist Ethics*, p. 136.

49. Ibid., pp. 137-138.

50. Walpola Rahula, *The Heritage of the Bhikkhu* (New York: Grove Press, 1974), p. 126.

51. See, for example, Buddhādāsa, *Me and Mine*, edited by Donald K. Swearer (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), pp. 141-145.

52. Matics, *Entering the Path of Enlightenment*, p. 157 (verse 1). The Sanskrit, from P.L. Vaidya (ed.), *Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva with the Commentary Pañjikā of Prajñākaramati* (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1960), p. 44, is

evaṃ gṛhṭvā sudṛḍham bodhicittaṃ jinātmajaḥ /

śikṣānatikrame yatnaṃ kuryānnyamatandritaḥ //

53. Ibid., p. 169. The Sanskrit, from P.L. Vaidya, *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, p. 69, is

evaṃ buddhvā parārtheṣu bhavetsatamutsthitaḥ /

niṣiddhamapyanuñātāṃ kṛpālorarthadarśitaḥ //

54. See Cecil Bendall and W.H.D. Rouse (trs.), *Śikṣa-Samuccaya: A Compendium of Buddhist Doctrine* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971), pp. 157-174. For the Sanskrit, see P.L. Vaidya (ed.), *Śikṣāmuccaya of Śāntideva* (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1961), pp. 90-99.

55. Keown, *The Nature of Buddhist Ethics*, p. 154.

56. Ibid.

57. G.S.P. Misra, *Development of Buddhist Ethics* (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1984), p. 137. He refers to Nalinaksha Dutt (ed.), *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1966), "Śīlapāṭalam," pp. 112-116.

58. See, for example, *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, Chapter IV, verses 8-10; Matics, *Entering the Path of Enlightenment*, p. 158.

59. Keown, *The Nature of Buddhist Ethics*, p. 159.

60. Ibid., p. 157.

61. Robert A.F. Thurman (tr.), *The Holy Teaching of Vimalakīrti: A Mahāyāna Scripture* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1976), p. 31.

62. Fu and Wawrytko, *Buddhist Ethics and Modern Society*, p. 7.

63. David W. Chappell, "Buddhist Responses to Religious Pluralism: What are the Ethical Issues, in *Buddhist Ethics and Modern Society*, edited by Charles Wei-hsun Fu and Sandra A. Wawrytko (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 355.
64. Rick Fields, "The Future of American Buddhism," *The Vajradhatu Sun*, 9, 1 (October-November, 1987), p. 26.
65. Harold Coward, "The Role of Scripture in the Self-Definition of Hinduism and Buddhism in India," *Studies in Religion*, 21, 2 (1992), p. 129.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 142.
67. Richard H. Robinson and Willard L. Johnson, *The Buddhist Religion: A Historical Introduction*, 3rd edition (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1982), p. 39.
68. Fu, "From *Paramārtha-satya* to *Samvṛti-satya*: An Attempt at Constructive Modernization of (Mahāyāna) Buddhist Ethics," p. 327.
69. *Ibid.*
70. For the published version of this paper, see Rick Fields, "The Future of American Buddhism," *The Vajradhatu Sun*, 9, 1 (October-November, 1987), pp. 1, 22, 24-26.
71. See, for example, Robert Aitkin, *The Mind of Clover: Essays in Zen Buddhist Ethics* (San Francisco: North Point Press, 1984), or Prebish, "Karma and Rebirth in the Land of the Earth Eaters."
72. See: Helen Tworkov, "The Formless Field of Buddhism," *Tricycle*, 1, 3 (Spring, 1992), p. 4.

73. Ibid.

74. Kornfield, in Don Morreale (ed.), *Buddhist America: Centers, Retreats, Practices* (Santa Fe, New Mexico: John Muir Publications, 1988), p. xv.

75. See: Rita Rita M. Gross, *Buddhism After Patriarchy* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1993).

76. Ibid., pp. 240-49.

77. See: Kenneth Kraft (ed.), *Inner Peace, World Peace: Essays on Buddhism and Nonviolence* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), and especially pp. 1-30.

78. Ibid., p. 24.

79. This statement was made by Lenore Friedman.

80. Harvey Aronson, *Love and Sympathy in Theravāda Buddhism* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980), p. 95.

81. Coward, "The Role of Scripture in the Self-Definition of Hinduism and Buddhism in India," p. 143.